The Injury in Receiving a Text Message by Beirne, Morgan
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2019
The Injury in Receiving a Text Message
Morgan Beirne
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Beirne, Morgan, "The Injury in Receiving a Text Message" (2019). Law School Student Scholarship. 961.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/961
M. Beirne   1 
 
The Injury in Receiving a Text Message 
Introduction  
This year, the Ninth Circuit held a single unsolicited call to a woman’s cellphone created 
enough harm for her to file suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”).1  The 
TCPA, codified in 1991, was initially enacted to combat companies sending advertisements to 
potential consumers through their personal facsimile (“fax”) machines.2  Since then, technology 
has advanced, and while the use of fax advertisements has declined, companies have looked to 
emerging technologies to reach customers.  Text messages are an appealing medium, with six 
billion text messages sent daily in 2011, and the average person sending or receiving thirty-five 
messages every day.3  
In 2016, the Supreme Court decided Spokeo v. Robins, a case analyzing the injury requirement 
for a claim filed under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.4  Since the decision, lower federal 
courts have used the decision to analyze other consumer litigation claims.5  Spokeo holds, “a 
plaintiff’s injury must be both ‘particularized’ and ‘concrete’ in order to have standing to sue.”6  
The issue being addressed in recent TCPA litigation is if the harms being alleged under the 
Act are “concrete and particularized.”  This has been difficult for modern courts as they have 
attempted to address claims that did not exist when the TCPA was enacted in 1991.  The unresolved 
question presents problems for both businesses and consumers, as businesses attempt to market to 
                                                     
1 Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 352 (3d Cir. 2017). 
2 Spencer W. Waller, Daniel B. Heidtke & Jessica Stewart, The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: 
Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing Technology, 26 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 343, 355 (quoting S. Rep. No. 
102-178, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 1968, 1970 (1991)). 
3 Marissa A. Potts, “Hello, it’s me [Please don’t sue me!]: Examining the FCC’s Overbroad Calling Regulations 
under the TCPA, 82 BROOKLYN L. REV. 281, 283 (2016). 
4 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1542 (2016). 
5 See, e.g. Vann Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017).  
6 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544. 
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consumers through the inexpensive and convenient methods available through modern 
telecommunication technology, and consumers attempt to preserve their right to privacy.  
Both the Third and the Ninth Circuits have addressed TCPA claims and found unwanted 
messages from businesses to constitute as “particularized” and “concrete” harms under Spokeo.7  
This consumer friendly approach has been the trend of the circuit courts; however, the Fourth 
Circuit has taken a defendant friendly position in its analysis for the harm requirement when 
applying the Spokeo test.8  
Interpretation of the TCPA by the courts under the Spokeo framework has construed the 
receiving of an unsolicited text message as an injury to a plaintiff.9  While this coincides with the 
legislative intent of the TCPA, it ignores the realities of the shift in how technology affects 
consumers.  This note will discuss the emerging inquiry on what should constitute a litigious injury 
for TCPA claims following Spokeo.  
Section I will discuss the TCPA, explaining its intended purpose.  Section II will explain the 
Spokeo case and discuss why the holding had an impact on the analysis of TCPA claims.  Section 
III will discuss how plaintiffs bring TCPA claims, and specifically, what the injury requirements 
are for successful TCPA claims.  Section IV will analyze the circuit court decisions for consumer 
protection claims following the Spokeo ruling.  Section V will look at how the TCPA interpretation 
has changed as technology has advanced, and Section VI will apply the current legal framework 
to the question of if a text message should constitute a concrete injury under the TCPA.  
                                                     
7 Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041; Susinno, 862 F.3d at 352. 
8 Dreher v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2017). 
9 Amanda Bronstad, Latest TCPA Decision Eases Path for Consumers, Deepens Circuit Split, 223 N.J. L. J. 1, 1.  
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I. Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
Prior to the TCPA, Congress had not addressed the new technologies that emerged at the 
end of the twentieth century in the telecommunications industry, leaving them unregulated and 
prone to abuse by unsolicited advertisers.10  One prominent marketing medium was the fax 
machine.  Advertisers would gain access to consumers’ numbers, then send promotions, often 
unsolicited, through consumers’ fax machines.11  This practice was inexpensive for companies as 
it placed the financial burden on consumers, whose ink and toner would be used to print the 
advertisements.12  Consumers also faced blocked phone lines and general annoyance as they had 
no control in receiving these advertisements.13  
States attempted to regulate these burdensome practices, but interstate telecommunication 
structures made the regulations ineffective.14  In response to state demand for interstate regulation, 
the 1991 Telephone Consumer Protection Act was enacted, with the purpose of “imposing 
restrictions on the use of telephones for unsolicited advertising by telephone and fax.”15  The TCPA 
was a response to the issue presented by modern telecommunication technology increasing access 
to consumers.16  Unlike other advertising regulations that focus on regulating an advertisement’s 
content, the TCPA focuses on regulating the medium of advertisement conveyance.17  
The TCPA protects consumers from unsolicited advertisements; defined as “any material 
advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services, which is transmitted 
                                                     
10 Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 347. 
11 Id. at 354.  
12 Id. 
13 Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “innocent Lawbreakers”: Striking the Right balance in the Private Enforcement 
of the Anti “Junk Fax” Provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 90 NEB. L. REV. 70, 79. 
14 Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 347. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 350. 
17 Id. 
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to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.”18  This definition 
excludes “(A) . . . any person with that person’s prior express invitation or permission, (B) . . . any 
person with whom the caller has an established business relationship, or (C) . . . a tax exempt 
nonprofit organization[s].”19  
TCPA claims are most commonly enforced by private actions.20  The Act allows plaintiffs 
to bring: (1) an action to recover for a monetary loss from a violation, or (2) an action to recover 
$500 in damages for each such violation, or (3) both.21  In addition, the court has the discretion to 
award punitive damages to the plaintiff of up to three times the amount recoverable for 
compensatory damages if it finds the defendant “willfully or knowingly” violated the TCPA.22  
Though the most common method of enforcement, private actions are limited in “incentivizing 
lawsuits against, and deterring the actions of, intentional violators” of the Act.23 
State governments have the authority to bring civil law suits under the TCPA when a 
company has shown a “pattern or practice of violations.”24  State governments have not used this 
power often, instead relying on private actions to enforce the TCPA.25  Because TCPA injuries are 
not physically harmful or dangerous, state governments do not prioritize enforcement.26  
The TCPA also permits administrative action against violators.27  The Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) is the agency responsible for administrative 
enforcement.28  The FCC has a form available on its website for consumers to report TCPA 
                                                     
18 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2017).  
19 Id. at § 227(a)(4) (2017).  
20 Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 348. 
21 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A)-(C).  
22 Id. at § 227(b)-(c). 
23 Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 348. 
24 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(2011). 
25 Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 375. 
26 Id. 
27 Linetsky, supra note 13 at 79. 
28 Id. 
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violations.29  Under the Act, “[a]ny person that is determined by the Commission . . . to have 
violated [the TCPA] shall be liable to the United States.”30  The FCC is also responsible for 
prescribing regulations to implement the statute.31  While the FCC has broad authority to enforce 
and interpret the statute, it is limited by slow processing, leaving a majority of TCPA enforcement 
in the hands of private litigants.32 
The TCPA has been applied to modern technologies that emerged after its enactment in 1991.33  
The FCC interprets the phrase, “to call,” as “communicat[ing] with a person by telephone.”34  
Under this interpretation, the Act applies to both voice calls and text messages.35  This is consistent 
with the intended purpose of protecting consumer privacy, as “a voice or text message [is] not 
distinguishable in terms of being an invasion of privacy.”36 
II. Spokeo v. Robins 
In 2016, a claim filed under the Fair Credit Reporting Act made its way to the Supreme Court.37  
The defendant operated a company that provided information about people.38  The controversy 
arose when the company gave incorrect information about the plaintiff to a third party.39  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the sufficiency of the injury claimed by the 
plaintiff.40  The Court held that “a plaintiff’s injury must be both ‘particularized’ and ‘concrete,’ 
and courts considering the issue must distinguish between those characteristics in their standing 
                                                     
29 Id. at 80. 
3047 U.S.C. § 227 (e)(5)(A)(i). 
31 Id. 
32 Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra, note 2 at 348. 
33 Id. at 366. 
34 Id. at 367. 
35 Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041 (citing In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14115). 
36 Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009). 
37 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544. 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
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analysis.”41  The Court based its holding on the Constitution, finding “a plaintiff ‘cannot allege a 
bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement of Article III.’”42 
III. Jurisdiction for TCPA Claims 
a. Article III Standing  
For a court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present a claim with standing.43  Standing 
is the “right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”44  Article III of 
the Constitution addresses federal court standing, requiring a case or controversy for a federal court 
to have jurisdiction.45  Article III has three requirements for the case or controversy requirements: 
(1) an injury-in-fact, (2) that was caused by the defendant, and (3) that is redressable.46  An injury-
in-fact is defined as “[a]n actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest, in contrast to 
an invasion that is conjectural or hypothetical.”47  If the defendant caused an injury-in-fact, and 
the injury is redressable, a federal court has Article III standing to hear and decide the case.48 
In addition to Article III standing, federal courts also require prudential standing.49  This 
doctrine specifies that “prudential rules should govern the determination [of] whether a party 
should be granted standing to sue . . . [t]he most important rule [being] that a plaintiff who asserts 
an injury must come within the ‘zone of interest’ arguably protected by the Constitution or a 
                                                     
41 Id. at 1545.  
42 U.S. CONST. art. III, 2.  See also, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544 at 1549. 
43 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
44Priya Khangura, Hurdles to the court: The Doctrine of Standing Under Statutory Violations, 11 DUKE J. CONST. 
LAW & PP SIDEBAR 41, 41 (2016) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
45 Id.  
46 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  
47 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (Bryan A. Garner ed., Thomson Reuters 5th Pocket ed. 2016).  
48 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
49Khangura, supra note 44. 
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statute.”50  Under the prudential-standing doctrine, a case with Article III standing may lack federal 
jurisdiction if there is no prudential standing.51  This requirement was enacted to limit the role of 
courts in areas of public dispute.52 
The prudential standing doctrine has two exceptions: (1) the existence of “countervailing 
circumstances,” or (2) if Congress grants “an express right of action to persons who otherwise 
would be barred.”53  These exceptions do not apply to the Article III standing requirements.54  
Federal courts require an injury-in-fact to establish jurisdiction, regardless of whether Congress 
granted a right of action by statute.55 
b. Harm Requirement  
In recent TCPA cases, circuit courts have used the “concrete” and “particularized” analysis 
from Spokeo when conducting the standing analysis.56  Spokeo holds that to satisfy the injury-in-
fact requirement under Article III for consumer litigation claims, the plaintiff must show an injury 
is “concrete and particularized.”57  An injury is concrete when it is de facto, meaning that it actually 
exists and is not abstract.58  A concrete injury does not have to cause a tangible harm.59 For many 
consumer litigation claims, the harm alleged is intangible.  While this does not bar an establishment 
of concreteness, a court must determine if an actual harm has been alleged. An injury is 
                                                     
50 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (Bryan A. Garner ed., Thomson Reuters 5th Pocket ed. 2016). 
51 Id. 
52 Khangura, supra note 44 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).  
53 Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). 
54 Id. at 51. 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g. Susinno, 862 F.3d at 346.  
57 Spokeo, 136 U.S. at 1548 (emphasis added). 
58 Id. at 1547-48.  
59 Id. 
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particularized when it “affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”60 To determine the 
sufficiency of an alleged injury, courts follow the two step inquiry from Spokeo.61 
The first step to determine sufficiency of an injury is to define the protected legal interest.62  
This can be done by looking to the language and legislative history of the statute.63  Though 
statutory intent indicates a likelihood of a recognizable harm, the Spokeo decision affirmed a 
statute granting a right to file a claim does not “automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact 
requirement.”64  
If the court finds a protected legal interest, the court then proceeds to step two; determine 
if the harm violates a legally protected interest.65  Justice Alito explained in Spokeo that, because 
the analysis is based on historical practices, “it [can be] instructive to consider whether an alleged 
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing 
a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”66  A legally protected interest can also be 
inferred by looking to the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.67 
IV. Circuit Court Cases Following Spokeo v. Robins 
a. 9th Circuit  
i. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness 
A 2017 case that applied the Spokeo analysis to a TCPA claim was Van Patten v. Vertical 
Fitness.68  The plaintiff filed suit after receiving a series of promotional texts from Vertical 
                                                     
60 Id. at 1549. 
61 Michael G. McLellan, Finding a Leg to Stand on: Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and Statutory Standing in Consumer 
Litigation, 31 Antitrust 49, 50 (2017). 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
65 McLellan, supra note 61 at 49.  
66136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
67 McLellan, supra 61 at 49.  
68 847 F.3d at 1041. 
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Fitness.69  Vertical Fitness was the company that took over a gym the plaintiff had previously been 
a member of.70  Though the plaintiff had only been a member of that gym for three days, the 
plaintiff provided his personal information, including his phone number, when submitting an 
application.71  Three years after leaving the gym, Vertical Fitness, which had obtained his number 
during their acquisition of the gym, sent the plaintiff promotional text messages.72 
In response to the text messages sent by Vertical Fitness, the plaintiff filed a putative class 
action under the TCPA.73  His claim alleged Vertical Fitness had “caus[ed] consumers actual 
harm” with “the aggravation that necessarily accompanies wireless spam” along with having to 
“pay their cell phone service providers for the receipt of such wireless spam.”74 
When the Ninth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s standing, it used the standard held in 
Spokeo.75  In determining if there had been a concrete harm, the court, looked to historically 
recognized cognizable harms in English and American courts.76  When Congress enacted the 
TCPA, it found that “‘unrestricted telemarketing can be an intrusive invasion of privacy’ and is a 
‘nuisance.’”77  In traditional English and American law, invasion of privacy and nuisance have 
been considered substantial harms, warranting judicial relief.78  The Ninth Circuit found that 
unsolicited calls and texts by their nature invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of recipients.79  
Because the harm addressed by the TCPA had historically been recognized, the Ninth Circuit held 
                                                     
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041.  
75 Id. 
76 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1540. 
77 Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
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the text messages were a concrete and particularized harm that entitled the plaintiff to both Article 
III and prudential standing.80 
b. 3rd Circuit  
i. Susinno v. Work Out World, Inc.  
In Sussino, The Third Circuit considered the harm requirement for a TCPA claim.81  The 
plaintiff in the case received a single unsolicited call to her cellphone from Work Out World, Inc. 
(“WOW”).82  The harm alleged by the plaintiff derived from a one minute prerecorded promotional 
message left on the plaintiff’s voicemail by WOW.83  In its defense, WOW asserted that “the 
structure of [the TCPA provision] limits the scope of ‘cellular telephone services’ to when ‘the 
called party is charged for the call.’”84  WOW cited to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that 
suggests “‘two or three’ calls would not be ‘highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person]’ 
which would create no injury-in-fact for the plaintiff to assert.”85  
The issue presented was whether the TCPA prohibited the defendant’s conduct, and if so, 
if the harm was sufficiently concrete and particularized to have Article III and prudential 
standing.86  After concluding the TCPA did apply, the Third Circuit analyzed the sufficiency of 
the plaintiff’s standing under the Spokeo framework.87  The court interpreted Spokeo as a 
“reiteration [of] traditional notions of standing,” specifically noting the traditional principle that 
the mere technical violation of a procedural requirement of a statute cannot, in and of itself, 
constitute an injury-in-fact. 88 
                                                     
80 Id. 
81862 F.3d. at 348. 
82 Id. at 352. 
83 Id. at 348. 
84 Id. at 349 
85 Id. at 351-52. 
86 Id. at 348. 
87 Susinno, 862 F.3d. at 350. 
88 Id. at 350, 52. 
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In applying the Spokeo standard, the court looked to whether there was a Congressionally 
defined injury.89  The TCPA applies “directly to single recorded calls from cell phones,” and in 
enacting the statute, Congress focused on protecting consumers’ privacy interests.90  In her 
complaint, the plaintiff alleged harm in the form of a “nuisance and invasion of privacy.”91  The 
court concluded the claim was the kind Congress intended to address in enacting the TCPA.92 
Under Spokeo, it is not enough to assert a Congressionally identified harm to satisfy 
standing; the harm must also be concrete and particularized.93  To determine if the harm was 
concrete, the Third Circuit looked to historical tradition to determine if the harm was recognized 
by English and American courts.94  In conducting this historical analysis, the court must find 
“newly established causes of action protect essentially the same interests that traditional causes of 
action sought to protect.”95  Looking at the alleged harm, the Third Circuit found TCPA claims, 
alleging an “invasion[] of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance,” are those that have 
historically been heard in American courts.96 
The Third Circuit conceded that, if the claim had been brought prior to the enactment of 
the TCPA, the alleged injury would not have been a concrete harm sufficient for establishing 
Article III standing. But, by enacting the statute, Congress had “elevat[ed] a harm that, while 
previously inadequate in the law,’ was of the same character of previously existing ‘legally 
cognizable injuries.’”97  Because Congress elevated the injury instead of creating a new kind of 
                                                     
89 Id. at 351. 
90 Id. at 351 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C)).  
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1540. 
94 Susinno, 862 F.3d at 351. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. (quoting Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043).  
97 Id. at 352. 
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injury, the court determined the harm was sufficient to establish Article III standing.98  Under this 
interpretation, the Third Circuit found a single one-minute voicemail was sufficient to confer 
standing before a federal court.99 
ii. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig. 
In the Third Circuit case, In re Horizon, the court analyzed the harm requirement for 
consumer litigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”.)100  The defendant, Horizon, 
owned laptops that contained the plaintiffs’ personal information.101  When those laptops were 
stolen, the plaintiffs sued the defendants, even though nothing had been done with the stolen 
information to injure the plaintiffs.102  The District Court found the plaintiffs did not have standing 
because “none of them had adequately alleged that the information was actually used to their 
detriment,” therefore there was no injury-in-fact.103 
In Circuit Judge Jordan’s opinion, the court analyzed the merit of the plaintiff’s argument 
that the defendant caused an injury by “‘plac[ing] [them] at an imminent, immediate, and 
continuing increased risk of harm from identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud. . . ’”104  In 
making its determination, the Third Circuit first looked to historical precedent, and found there 
was evidence that, “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”105 
Within the Third Circuit, there were inconsistent interpretations of the sufficiency of a 
statutory harm for conferring Article III standing.106  The Third Circuit reiterated their own 
                                                     
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 629 (3d Cir. 2017). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 634 
104 Id. at 634 (quoting App. At 40.) 
105 Id. at 635 (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982). 
106 In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 635. 
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precedent, that, “[t]he proper analysis of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff suffered an 
actual injury, not on whether a statute was violated.”107  This is contrary to many of the previous 
district court decisions within the circuit, which had allowed statutory violations to constitute a 
cognizable injury, without considering if there was an actual harm.108 
To resolve the discrepancy within the Third Circuit, the Court looked to Spokeo.109  The 
Circuit Court interpreted Spokeo to mean that “Congress ‘has the power to define injuries . . . that 
were previously inadequate in law.’”110  Under this interpretation, legislatures can “elevate 
intangible harms into concrete harms.”111 
When applying Spokeo, the Third Circuit determined the facts of the current case did not 
require the “consider[ation] [of] the full reach of congressional power to elevate a procedural 
violation into an injury in fact” as “this case [did] not strain that reach.”112  Instead, the court 
determined that case law and common law allowed protection for the plaintiff’s right to privacy, 
and that “with privacy torts, improper dissemination of information can itself constitute a 
cognizable injury.”113  While the court conceded this alone may not have been sufficient to confer 
Article III standing, “with the passage of the FCRA, Congress established that the unauthorized 
dissemination of personal information by a credit reporting agency causes an injury in and of itself 
. . .” and through its enactment of the FCRA, Congress had shown it “believed that the violation 
of the FCRA causes a concrete harm to consumers.”114  The Third Circuit concluded the plaintiffs’ 
                                                     
107 Id. at 635, n. 14. 
108 Id. at 635.  
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 638.  
111 Id.  
112 In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638. 
113 Id. at 638-39. 
114 Id. at 639.  
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had alleged a sufficient injury that was not a “mere technical or procedural violation of the FCRA,” 
and remanded the plaintiffs’ case so it could proceed to litigation.115  
c. Fourth Circuit  
i. Dreher v. Experion Information Solutions  
Dreher v. Experion Information Solutions stands out as a defendant friendly decision amongst 
the consumer protection cases that have had standing analyzed with the Spokeo framework.  While 
Dreher was brought under the FCRA, it is significant for its analysis of the concrete and 
particularized aspect of the alleged injury-in-fact.116  
The controversy involved a 69,000-member class action, initiated by Dreher against 
Experian.117  Dreher, in undergoing a background check for a security clearance with the federal 
government found a delinquent credit card account on his credit report.118 Dreher attempted to 
contact the company associated with the card to fix the mistake.119  Not indicated on the credit 
report was the fact that the company associated with the delinquent card had closed during the 
2008 financial crisis.120  The portfolio of that company had been given to another company, and 
was then assigned to CardWorks, Inc. and CardWorks Servicing L.L.C (collectively, 
“Cardworks”).121  Experian chose not to change the name of the company on the plaintiffs’ credit 
reports to comply with historic practices and to prevent consumer confusion.122  Dreher brought 
the class action to federal court; he argued Experian’s failure to change the name of the company 
listed on his credit report caused an informational injury.123  
                                                     
115 Id. at 640. 
116 Dreher, 856 F.3d. at 340. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id.at 341. 
121 Id. 
122 Dreher, 856 F.3d at 341. 
123 Id. at 342. 
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At trial, Experian argued the plaintiff lacked Article III standing.124  The District Court rejected 
Experian’s argument, finding “the FCRA ‘creates a statutory right to receive the “sources of 
information” for one’s credit report,’” which created an injury-in-fact sufficient to meet the burden 
of establishing Article III standing.125  During the district court trial, Spokeo had not yet been 
decided; therefore, the concrete and particularized requirements outlined in Spokeo were not 
considered. 126  
Because of the anticipated significance of Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit held Dreher in abeyance 
until the decision was announced.127  Using Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s 
claim that he had suffered an injury-in-fact, “because he was denied ‘specific information to which 
[he] w[as] entitled under the FCRA.”128  Using the Spokeo analysis, the court found the harm 
claimed by the plaintiff was not concrete, and therefore, there was no Article III standing.129 
The plaintiff attempted to establish concreteness by arguing the harm he suffered was “a ‘real’ 
harm with adverse effect.’”130  The Fourth Circuit rejected the contention, finding Dreher was 
alleging a pure statutory violation, with very little injury to himself.131  The most significant injury 
the plaintiff alleged was the fact that his security clearance with the federal government was 
threatened by Experian’s failure to comply with the FCRA.132  The court found, however, that 
while an actual harm to his security clearance would constitute an injury sufficient to establish 
Article III standing, Dreher’s security clearance was not affected by Experian’s policy, meaning 
                                                     
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Dreher, 856 F.3d at 345. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 346. 
132 Id. 
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there was “no real world harm on Dreher.”133  Because the court found Dreher did not have an 
injury-in-fact sufficient to establish Article III standing, the case was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.134 
V. Interpreting Modern TCPA Claims 
In 1991, one of the leading harms Congress sought to prevent by enacting the TCPA was 
abuse of consumers’ fax machines for unsolicited promotional purposes.135  The abuse of this 
practice led to usage of consumers’ tangible resources, including paper, ink, and toner, as well as 
tying up landlines and being a general nuisance.136  The customers receiving promotional faxes 
often had little control in the faxes being sent, and even if they were given the option to opt out, it 
was not until after the advertiser had already used the consumer’s resources.137  
Today, cell phones have changed the landscape of TCPA enforcement.  Studies show that 
where once having a home phone was a staple of American households, the trend today is for 
people to disconnect their home phones and rely exclusively on cell phones.138  As more people 
rely on cellphones, having access to consumers through their phone may cause increasingly 
detrimental effects.139  If the proper regulations are not in place, advertisers can establish more 
invasive telemarketing practices to access to consumers.140 
Following Spokeo, most appellate courts have found a phone call constitutes a concrete and 
particularized harm that can withstand scrutiny under the Spokeo standard.141  These findings are 
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based on the idea that the violation of the statute demonstrates a concrete injury, and that an 
invasion of privacy is a legally protected interest.142  An argument that supports this interpretation 
is that, even with modern technology, the cost of advertising is shifted to the consumer.143  This 
shifting in cost is especially detrimental to the twenty-three percent of all wireless subscribers who 
have prepaid cellphone plans.144 
Most courts uphold a plaintiff’s claim of harm under the TCPA under the justification that the 
harm alleged is rooted in common law.145  As suggested in Spokeo, when the concrete and 
particularized harm element is uncertain, it can be helpful to look to traditional English and 
American law.146  The American common law has long recognized a right against “unreasonable 
intrusion upon the seclusion of another”.147  Since the Congressional intent in enacting the TCPA 
was in part to protect the privacy interests of consumers, the circuit courts have rationally 
concluded that the harm is concrete and particularized, and thus sufficient to establish Article III 
standing.148 
Consumers can  still be harmed if advertisers are allowed to send promotional text messages, 
even with opt-out options.149  When consumer respond to a promotional text message to opt-out 
of receiving future messages, the advertiser has confirmation they reached an active cell phone 
number.150  These entities can then sell that information to others, putting consumers at risk for 
continued privacy invasion.151  
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Additionally, advertisers can include links that may lead consumers to accidently sign up for 
services through the same messages offering the opt-out option.152  The prevalence of cellphone 
use, as well as the savviness of advertisers, can put consumers at risk for prolonged and unwanted 
invasions of privacy. 
Though the TCPA was enacted to protect consumers from predatory businesses, today, 
businesses themselves are at risk if the TCPA is too broadly interpreted.  This is especially true for 
small businesses, which often form marketing plans without knowledge of the extent of the TCPA 
or the ramifications for violating the TCPA.153 Businesses are facing confusion as a result of 
inconsistent enforcement of the TCPA.154  This is further complicated for the businesses operating 
across state lines.  With varying interpretations of the TCPA amongst federal and state 
jurisdictions, it can be difficult for companies to know if a marketing strategy will lead to a TCPA 
violation.155  This inconsistency increases the likelihood a businesses will accidently violate the 
TCPA.  Under a broad interpretation of harm, these companies may be found liable, irrespective 
of the business’ lack of intent.  Congress’ goal in enacting the TCPA was to punish “malicious and 
intentional violators,” therefore, businesses may be unduly harmed under the current trend of 
interpretation.156  
Additionally, a common payment plans consumers subscribe to for text messaging allows 
them to send and receive unlimited messages for a fixed price.  For a customer with this type of 
plan, the customer pays the same amount for text messages, regardless of if it is a promotional 
message.  When consumers brought the initial TCPA claims in 1991, they were able to show a 
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financial detriment in receiving an unwanted fax.157  For consumers today, receiving a text 
message does not involve the same detriments the TCPA was enacted to prevent.  The discrepancy 
in the amount of harm demonstrated by the initial claims and claims filed today is rarely 
considered, and should be further analyzed by the legislature and the FCC to determine if current 
TCPA claims warrant the same degree of protection that was granted for consumers in 1991. 
VI. Is a Text Message an Injury?  
As telecommunication technology has increased, courts have attempted to interpret legislation 
that was enacted before the commonplace technology used today was in existence.158  The 
prevalence of text messaging has led to businesses using it for marketing.159  As explained 
previously, the TCPA has been interpreted to govern text messages.160  Because of this, claims are 
beginning to arise under the TCPA from plaintiffs alleging promotional text messages from 
companies amount to sufficient harm to confer Article III standing.161 
When Spokeo was released, it was applied to a wide variety of consumer litigation claims, 
including TCPA claims, to aid courts in determining if the injuries alleged were sufficient to 
support Article III standing.162  After the Susinno decision held a single unsolicited phone call was 
sufficient to confer Article III standing, it was an opinion of legal scholar, Amanda Bronstad, that 
the TCPA was being interpreted in a consumer friendly fashion, with a decidedly broad 
interpretation of what could constitute harm.163 
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As previously noted, text messaging has taken up prominence in today’s society.  For 
businesses, it is an efficient and inexpensive method to market products and services, and has the 
ability to reach a large population over various demographics.  For consumers however, receiving 
text messages from businesses can feel like an invasion, and alongside being a nuisance, can lead 
to accidental purchases if companies send misleading promotions.  
As of now, one case alleging an injury by way of text message has made it to the Circuit Court 
level.164  While that case found the text message was not sufficient to confer an injury, an analysis 
of similar cases presents an argument that other courts would find a text message a sufficient injury 
to confer Article III standing.165  Because of the influence text messaging has on today’s society, 
it is imperative to consider because (1) businesses should be aware of the extent they can use text 
messages as a promotional devise; (2) consumers who are truly being harmed by a business’s 
promotional tactics should be able to find recourse; and (3) consumers should be made aware of 
their rights so businesses cannot evade liability just because the injury is relatively minor.  
Additionally, it is important for a consensus by the higher federal courts as text messaging can 
and often does allow a business to reach consumers across a wide range of jurisdictions. 
Consistency in judicial interpretation will allow companies to better comply their practices to the 
law.  
a. Spokeo Analysis 
The Spokeo analysis has been important for determining the injury requirement of 
consumer protection claims, and is therefore important for determining if a text message is a 
sufficient injury for TCPA claims.  Courts utilizing Spokeo have used it to determine if injuries 
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alleged by plaintiffs are “concrete and particularized.”166  Justice Alito defined a particularized 
injury as one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”167  The Court defines 
a “concrete” injury as one that is real as opposed to abstract.168  The opinion in Spokeo specifically 
differentiates these two terms and requires that both be met to confer standing.169  Without an 
“appreciat[ion] [for] the distinction between concreteness and particularization,” a court’s standing 
analysis is incomplete. 170 
i. Concreteness  
 Using the Spokeo analysis, a single unsolicited text message from a business can constitute 
a concrete injury.  An injury is concrete if, “it [] actually exist[s],” or is de facto.171  In Spokeo, the 
Court specifically states that being “tangible” is not a requirement for a concrete injury172   
In analyzing if an intangible harm would constitute a concrete injury, Justice Alito points 
to an analysis of “history and the judgment of Congress” to aid in the analysis.173 Historical 
practices are useful, as an “intangible harm [that] has a close relationship to a harm that has 
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English and American courts,” is 
more likely to constitute a sufficient concrete injury against a plaintiff.174 Legislative Acts are 
important because (1) the legislature is in a “position[] to identify intangible harms that meet 
minimum Article III requirements and (2) “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally 
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate at law.”175  Though 
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a legislative act may be indicative of a concrete injury, it is not conclusive.176  It would not be 
considered sufficient for a plaintiff to allege a “mere procedural violation, divorced from any 
concrete harm . . . .”177 
 In Sussino, the court summarized that an injury is concrete when the plaintiff “sues under 
a statute alleging ‘the very injury [the statute] is intended to prevent,’ and the injury ‘has a close 
relationship to a harm . . . traditionally . . . providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American 
courts . . . .”178  When applying this to the plaintiff’s claim regarding a single phone call from the 
defendant, the court noted that (1) Congress had identified the injury and it was the very injury 
Congress was attempting to protect plaintiffs from, and (2) “TCPA claims closely relate to 
traditional claims for ‘invasions of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance [which] have 
long been heard by American courts.’”179  It was based on this analysis the court found the plaintiff 
had alleged a concrete injury.180 
 Based on the Spokeo analysis and the subsequent analysis of “concreteness” in the circuit 
cases that followed, it seems likely that sending an unsolicited text message constitutes a concrete 
injury.  The TCPA has been construed to apply to text messages.181  The intent of Congress in 
enacting the TCPA was to “protect the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers by 
placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls . . . .”182  Protection of a consumer’s 
privacy by businesses wanting to send unsolicited promotional text messages would fit into the 
legislative intent.  
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 Additionally, as referenced in Susinno, TCPA claims are rooted in the common law 
protection of privacy, intrusion of seclusion, and nuisance.183  Based on both the legislation’s aim 
to protect the consumer’s privacy interest as well as the common law’s interest in protecting similar 
interests, an unsolicited text message would constitute a harm to a plaintiff.  
ii. Particularized 
If a plaintiff were to receive a text message and file suit in response to that text message, it 
would constitute a particularized injury.  A particularized injury is one that effects the plaintiff as 
an individual.184  The plaintiff argued in Spokeo that the defendant had “violated his statutory 
rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” and that his, “interests . . . [were] individualized 
rather than collective.”185  
If a plaintiff is filing suit in response to receiving a text message, then that person’s statutory 
rights under the TCPA have been allegedly violated.  This is sufficient to confer a particularized 
injury. 
Conclusion  
While it may seem outlandish given the proclivity of text messages and the lack of significant 
harm, the law as it stands today, when considering both the TCPA and Spokeo, allows plaintiffs to 
sue for the receipt of an unsolicited text message.  
While general standing may be conferred, other issues should factor into the allowance of 
litigation on the grounds of a text message, such as prudential standing and implied consent by 
consumers.  There should also be a consideration of the logic in allowing such litigation to 
commence on the basis of the TCPA.  When the TCPA was enacted, consumers were facing abuses 
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by businesses that resulted in a nuisance, a waste of consumer’s resources, and potential inability 
of consumers to use their fax machines.  In comparison, the detriment of receiving a text message 
is arguably minor.  Consumers are often able to block numbers they no longer wish to receive calls 
or messages from.  Additionally, single text messages are inexpensive, and for many, come as part 
of a plan that makes it so the consumer does not spend additional money for receipt of that 
message.  Further, when a text message is received, it seems unlikely that the phone will be unable 
to function as the consumer wishes it to for any significant amount of time. 
That being said, it is well recognized that consumers have a right to privacy and the U.S. legal 
system has recognized that right as telecommunication technologies have advanced.  While 
technology was once limited in location, today, cell phones allow consumers to have their mobile 
devices almost anywhere, making it so messaging from an unsolicited caller is arguably more 
intrusive than ever before.  Additionally, given the wide variety of cellphone plans offered, many 
consumers still face a financial burden, especially if businesses malicious and abusive promotional 
strategies. 
Ultimately, businesses should be able to formulate a clear marketing plan, without fear of 
inadvertently intruding on the rights of consumers, and consumers should have the right to protect 
their privacy.  As it stands, the TCPA is outdated.  When the TCPA was enacted in 1991, text 
messaging was not yet in existence, but today accounts for a substantial part of many people’s 
lives.  Even given its importance, Congress has yet to pass specific legislation to address the duties 
and rights of businesses and consumers in regards to promotional text messages. 
To better accommodate both businesses and consumer’s interests, new legislation should be 
considered to address the role of text messages in advertising.  By conducting their own research 
and considering the voice of the people, Congress is in the best position to determine when there 
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should be standing for a single text message.  Until then, under Spokeo, plaintiffs will be injured 
by receiving a text message.  
 
 
